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Barish: "Sex-Plus" Discrimination: A Discussion of Fisher v. Vassar Colle

COMMENT

"SEX-PLUS" DISCRiMINATION: A DISCUSSION

OF FISHER v. VASSAR COLLEGE'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VII2 clearly sets forth that an employer may not discriminate
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin However,
what happens when an employer only discriminates against particular
members of a minority group? Suppose an employer regularly hires
women, but only white women or unmarried women; is this a violation
of Title VII? Under Title VII, an employer may not discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin4 . Yet there is
nothing in Title VII that prohibits an employer from hiring only select

1. Nos. 94-7737, 94-7785, 94-9125, 1995 WL 527804 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 1995), reveg, 852 F.
Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20JOe-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994))
[hereinafter Title VII].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
4. Id. (emphasis added). I emphasize the word "or" because Title VII indicates that an
employer may not discriminate on the basis of race or color or religion or sex or national origin.
However, the statute does not state that an employer may not discriminate on the basis of race and
sex or race and religion, etc. For instance, the use ofthe word "or" indicates that the employer may
not discriminate on the basis of sex, but does not indicate that the employer may not discriminate
on the basis of sex and race.
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members of a minority group.5
The doctrine of "sex-plus" discrimination eliminates the loophole in
Title VII that allows employers to selectively hire members of a minority
group.6 The meaning of "sex-plus" discrimination cannot be found in a
legal dictionary or in the text of Title VII. Instead, the doctrine of "sexplus" discrimination has grown out of case law, starting with Phillipsv.
Martin Marietta,' and has been defined as occurring in the following
two situations:
(1) when an employer discriminates against employees on the basis
of an immutable characteristic, such as race, age, and national
origin; or
(2) when an employer has one hiring policy for men and another for
women, and the policy distinction is based on some fundamental
right (e.g., the right to marry or the right to have children).8
"Sex-plus" discrimination is to be contrasted with what this author
labels "simple sex" discrimination. "Simple sex" discrimination is the
outright refusal by employers to hire women or other minorities because
they feel it is their right to do so.9 This doctrine has been very
instrumental in preventing employers from denying women employment
on the basis of sexual stereotyping or the employer's intent to somehow
"protect" the women."0 When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
originally enacted, employers were permitted to rely on sexual stereo-

5. If taken literally, Title VII does not prohibit an employer from hiring only married women
or black men or Asians under the age of forty. As long as the employer hires some women, some
blacks, and some Asians, the employer is technically complying with Title VII. However, this
comment attempts to demonstrate that such an employer is not complying with the true intent of
Title VILo
6. See. eag., Phillips v. Marietta, 400 U.S. 542,544 (1971) (holding that an employer may not
deny employment to women with pre-school aged children without denying employment to men with
pre-school aged children); Dolter v. Wahert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa, 1980)
(holding that an employer may not deny employment to unwed mothers without denying
employment to unwed fathers).
7. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) [hereinafter Phillips].
8. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
private employers are prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and women only when
the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics (e.g., ethnicity) or legally protected rights
(e.g., the right to marry)).
9. ad
10. See RICHARD TROTtER & SUSAN RAWSON ZACUR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF

EMPLOY

NT DISCRIMINATION 61 (1986). Butsee Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,336 (1977)

(upholding a law which imposed a height requirement for prison guards and had the effect of excluding women).
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For instance, some

employers lawfully denied positions to married women for no other
reason than that they considered a wife's place to be in the home with
her children. 2 Section II of this Comment explores the doctrine of
"sex-plus" discrimination by analyzing both its historical development
and recent application by the courts. Section II0 then provides a detailed
analysis of Fisher v. Vassar College, a recent federal case specifically

involving the issue of "sex plus" discrimination. 3 Finally, the Comment concludes with an explanation as to why the Second Circuit correctly reversed an earlier court's decision and why the Supreme Court
should deny certiorari if the case is brought for appeal.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF "SEx-PLus" DISCRIMINATION
A. Title VII and the Theory of "Sex-Plus" Discrimination
Title VII, from its inception to the present day, has not always been

welcomed with open arms.

4

After all, Title VII interferes with the

rights of employers to run their businesses as they see fit." Under Title

VII, employers are prohibited from denying employment to women and
minorities; in fact, they are now required to hire women and minorities. 6 In spite of this, some employers attempt to undermine Title
VII by way of "sex-plus" discrimination.
Taken literally, Title VII does not prevent an employer from hiring
only certain types of women or minorities. 7 As a result, some employ-

11. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,718 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that
it was unlawful for the employer to deny women the opportunity to work in job classifications which
required lifting over 35 pounds); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th
Cir. 1969) (holding that it was unlawful for an employer to deny women jobs which would require
being on call 24 hours a day and lifting equipment over 30 pounds, without meeting the burden of
proving that all or substantially all women would not be able to perform that job).
12. This notion will be discussed in detail throughout the Comment.
13. 852 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd,Nos. 94-7737, 94-7785, 94-9125, 1995 WL
527804 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 1995).
14. See generally Nadine Taub, Keeping Women In Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se As A
Form OfEmploymentDiscrimination,21 B.C. L. REV. 345,345-49 (1980) (discussing the disparate
treatment of women in the work force).
15. The mere existence of Title VII limits the employer's ability to not hire women and
minorities, thereby interfering with the rights of employers to hire whomever they choose.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states that it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of "an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
However, if Title VII were to be strictly read, it would not prevent an employer from only
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ers have tried to exclude sub-groups of one sex or race by claiming that
they were not qualified employees.13 These employers simply claim
that the discrimination is not based on sex, but rather on some neutral
characteristic such as marriage, parenthood, or having long hair. 9
Thus, employers may claim that there was no sex discrimination because
the denial was based on a neutral characteristic rather than on gender.2
It is this denial of employment to a select group
of a protected class that
21
has been termed "sex-plus" discrimination.
Title VII is one of eleven titles from the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 The Act, as a whole, bars discrimination in public accommodations, federal funding, voting rights, education, and employment. 3 Title
VII deals strictly with employment discrimination and bars discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin. 24 The
purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment based
on these characteristics.
While the "sex-plus" discrimination theory is grounded within Title
VII, it is neither mentioned in nor referred to by the title. As such, the
theory was created by the courts as opposed to Congress.2 6 Judge
Brown coined the term in his dissent to the denial of a petition for
rehearing in Phillips v. Martin Marietta2 He wrote that without the
implied notion of "sex-plus," the impact of Title VII would be
crushed. 23 According to Judge Brown, the theory is necessary in order

hiring women who could lift 35 pounds or only hiring women who do not have children. Under
Title VII as long as the employer hires some women, the employer is protected. Therefore, it would
seem as though an employer could lawfully hire only women who were not married or women who
did not have children.
18. STEPHEN N. SHULMAN & CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYiENT

OPPoRTuNrrY 5-57 (1990).
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MARK A. RoTHsTmN & LANCE LmBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 225
(1994).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
26. The term "sex-plus" is never mentioned in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17.
27. 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1260. Judge Brown stated:
Free to add non-sex factors, the rankest sort of discrimination against women can be
worked by employers. This could include, for example, all sorts of physical characteristics, such as minimum weight (175 lbs.), minimum shoulder width, minimum biceps
measurement, minimum lifting capacity (100 lbs.), and the like. Others could include
minimum educational requirements (minimum high school, junior college), intelligence
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to enforce Title VI?'
The doctrine of "sex-plus" prevents the
employer from circumventing Title VII by simply specifying a characteristic that is unprotected by the statute as the basis for denying employment.3" For example, without the implied protection of "sex-plus",
employers could simply decide not to hire women and claim that the
reason was the women's physical build rather than their sex.
B. The Philhips-ManhartRationale
Phillipsv. Martin Marietta Corp.3" is the leading case on the issue
of "sex-plus" discrimination. In 1966, Mrs. Ida Phillips' application for
the position of assembly trainee at Martin Marietta was denied.3 She
was informed that the employer was not accepting job applications from
women with pre-school age children?3 However, the company did
accept applications from men with pre-school age children;3 therefore,
an application supplied by Mr. Phillips would have been accepted. As
a result, Mrs. Phillips filed suit alleging that she was denied the position
because of her sex 5
At the time Mrs. Phillips applied for the job, approximately 70-75%
of the applicants were women.3 6 Furthermore, 75-80% of those offered
the job were women.3 7 Therefore, there was absolutely no showing of
discrimination against women per se 3 8 The question before the court,
rather, was whether an employer could institute one hiring practice for
women and another for men, or if such a practice constituted a violation
of Title VII?39
The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of Title VII for
Martin Marietta to apply one hiring policy for women with pre-school

tests, aptitude tests, etc.
Id.
29. Id.
30. See, eg., Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545.
31. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
32. Id. at 543.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. More specifically, the question was whether Martin Marietta could require that female
employees not have pre-school-age children while allowing male employees to have pre-school-age
children.
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age children and another for men with pre-school age children. 0
However, because it was clear that Martin Marietta did not have a bias

toward women per se,4 but rather treated women with pre-school age
children differently than men with pre-school age children, Phillips was
more than a "simple" sex discrimination case; it was a case of "sex plus"

discrimination.
The Phillips court did not hold that it is always impermissible for
an employer to use differential hiring policies based on sex.42 For
example, Martin Marietta could have applied different hiring standards
if it proved that a woman's family obligations were significantly relevant
to her job performance as an assembly trainee, and that as a result of
such, she would be unable to perform the job.43 This would have qualified as a bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title VI.4
However, Justice Marshall cautioned in his concurring opinion that
sexual stereotypes of women should not be used as the basis for a bona
fide occupational qualification.45 Justice Marshall stated that the bona

40. Phillips,400 U.S. at 544.
41. Id. at 543.
42. Id. at 546. There is an exception if the employer can show that there is a bona fide
occupational qualification which justifies not employing members of a protected class. Id.
43. Id. at 545.
44. Id. at 544. If Martin Marietta could prove that a woman with pre-school-age children was
unable to perform the job, Martin Marietta could claim that not having pre-school-age children is
a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." Id This requirement would then be a bona fide occupational
qualification exception to Title VII.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e)
states in pertinent part:
(1)it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise; and
(2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, or university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees
of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution
or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled,
or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association,
or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational
institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propaganda of a particular
religion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
45. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545.
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fide occupational qualification exception should only be applied in
situations where
the job requires the physical characteristics of only one
46
of the sexes.

In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, the Supreme Court expanded
upon its earlier decision in Phillips4
That suit was brought because
an employer calculated its employees' monthly pension plan fees based

on gender mortality rates which demonstrated that women live longer
than men.4s The issue before the Court was whether the existence or

nonexistence of discrimination should be determined on a class or an
individual basis 9 The Supreme Court held that the language of Title
VII clearly requires the focus to be placed on the individual, and not the
class from which the individual is a member." Therefore, it is unlawful

46. Id. at 545-46. The exception only applies in circumstances where the nature of the job
requires the person to be a male or female, for example: fashion model, actor, or actress. Id.at 547.
Equal Employment Commission, Guidelines On Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 16042 (1994) states in pertinent part:
Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification
(a) The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception
as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Label - "Men's jobs" and "Women's
jobs" - tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the
other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in
general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate among
women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men less
capable of assembling intricate equipment: that women are less capable
ofaggressive salesmanship. The principle ofnondiscrimination requires
that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and
not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.
Qii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of
coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered
specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purposes of authenticity or genuineness, the
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification,
e.g., an actor or actress.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2.
47. 435 U.S. 702 (1978) [hereinafter Manhart].
48. Id. at 702.
49. Id. at 708.
50. Id. In reaching this determination the court relied on the fact that Title VII refers to
"individuals," not "classes:' Id. The court also stated:
Even if the statutory language were less clear, the basic policy ofthe statute requires that
we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes. Practices that classify
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for an employer to rationalize its differential hiring practices on the basis
of generalizations and stereotypes regarding a class of people. 1 The

goal of Title VII is to provide protection to women and minorities as
individuals, not as a group.'

Thus, the fact that an employer hires both

men and women becomes irrelevant when the employer applies different
rules to similarly situated men and women 3
The consequence of Phillips,in connection with Manhart,is that an
employer may not discriminate against individuals within a protected
class unless the employer demonstrates that there is an underlying bona

fide occupational qualification exception

4

However, there is a

discrepancy within the lower courts as to when the Philhips-Manhart
rationale should be applied.
The courts are in agreement that no
restrictive rules can be applied to only one of the sexes when both men
and women are hired 6 The disagreement arises over whether the same
principles hold true where the employer only employs members of one

sex.'

In other words, the courts are split as to whether the same rules

govern situations where the employer only hires women, and chooses to
discriminate amongst them.5"

employees in terms ofreligion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about
groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.
Id. at 709.
51. Therefore, the City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power's practice of charging
women more money for their pension plans was found to be a violation of Title VII. The policy was
based on statistical proof that women outlive men. However, this statistical information is a class
generalization and not an appropriate justification for such a differential policy. Id. at 709-11.
52. Manhart,435 U.S. at 708.
53. SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 18, at 5-58 (1990). For example, it is a Title VII
violation where an employer refuses to hire married women but willingly employs married men.
54. SHILJLAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 18, at 5-57.
55. SH UMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 18, at 5-57.
56. SHtLMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 18, at 5-57.
57. SHuLMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 18, at 5-57.
58. See E.E.O.C. v. Delta Airlines, 578 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the nomarriage rule applied to women was not "sex-plus" discrimination on the basis of gender because,
as there were no males hired as stewardesses, the women were not being treated differently than the
men; therefore, the discrimination was on the basis ofmarriage, not sex); Stroud v. Delta Air Lines,
544 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the no-marriage rule did not constitute "sex plus"
discrimination because it was only applied to flight attendants who happened to all be female); see
also Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1983). ContraSprogis v. United States Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding no-marriage rule applied only to women was sex-plus
discrimination).
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C.

Sex Plus Marriage

Marriage has often been used as a characteristic to differentiate
between male and female employees, particularly in the airline industry 9 For the most part, courts have held that no-marriage rules must
be applied equally to both sexes in order to avoid a Title VII violation." However, as indicated above, there has been some dispute as to
whether no-marriage rules violate Title VII when an employer only
employs women 1 Several airlines have required that their flight
attendants and ticket agents be unmarried.62
Section 1604.4 of EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex 3 provides:
(a) The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which
forbids or restricts the employment of married women and which
is not applicable to married men is discrimination based on sex
prohibited by title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It does not seem
to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but
only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the
application of the rule, such application involves a discrimination
based on sex.
(b) It may be that under certain circumstances, such a rule could be
justified within the meaning of section 703(e)(1) of title VII. We
express no opinion on this question at this time except to point
out that sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must be
justified in terms of the peculiar requirements of the particularjob
and not on the basis of a general principle such as the desirability
of spreading work."

59. See, eg., DeltaAir Lines, 578 F.2d at 115; Stroud, 544 F.2d at 892; Sprogis, 444 F.2d at

1194.
60. See, ag., DeltaAir Lines, 578 F.2d at 117 (holding that a no-marriage rule is permissible
only if applied to men as well as women); Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (holding that the no-marriage
rule is impermissible when it is only applied to female employees).
61. See cases cited supra note 58.
62. While those cases concerning no-marriage rules imposed upon female stewardesses are

relevant to the discussion ofsex-plus discrimination, it should be noted that these cases are no longer
as influential as they once were because several courts have since held that being a female is not a
bona fide occupational qualification for airline flight attendants and ticket agents. E.g., Hailes v.
United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that being a female was not a bona
fide occupational qualification for flight attendants and ticket agents).
63. Equal Employment Commission, Guidelines On Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.4 (1994).

64. Id.
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While" these guidelines clearly set forth that sex plus marriage
discrimination should not be tolerated, the message has not always been

so clear.6" For instance, Mary Burke Sprtgis was discharged as a
United Air Lines' stewardess on June 19, 1966,66 for violating that
company's no-marriage rule.67 At the time, United Air Lines' policy
dictated that they not employ married female stewardesses. 68 However,
69
when that policy was changed, Mrs. Sprogis sued United Air Lines.
The Court of Appeals ruled in Mrs. Sprogis' favor and held that United

Air Lines' no-marriage policy was a Title VII violation, regardless of the
fact that this rule was only applied to female employees working as
stewardesses. 0
Another influential case in the area of sex plus marriage discrimina-

tion was brought by Etta Ruth Stroud in 1977.!' Etta Ruth Stroud had
worked as a stewardess for Delta Air Lines for approximately eleven3
years72 before being forced to resign due to her pending marriage
At the time, it was Delta's policy not to employ married women. By
March 1971, Delta elected to rescind their no-marriage policy.74
However, when Mrs. Stroud sought to be reinstated, her application was

65. All cases cited in this Comment illustrate the fact that employers are not aware that "sexplus" discrimination is a violation of Title VII. If employers fully understood the doctrine of sex
plus discrimination, the issue of whether it is lawful to employ different hiring standards based on
a person's gender would not arise.
66. Sprogi, 444 F.2d at*1196.
67. Id.The no-marriage rule was first applied in the 1930's. Id. The rule required that female
stewardesses be single when employed and remain so unmarried under penalty of discharge. Id.
68. Id.
69. In a letter dated November 7, 1968, United Air Lines agreed that, "Marriage will not
disqualify a Stewardess from continuing in the employ of the Company as a Stewardess, but any
Stewardess who shall hereafter become pregnant shall have her services with the Company permanently severed as a Stewardess." Id at 1196 n2.
70. The court held:
It is irrelevant to this determination that the no-marriage rule has been applied to only
female employees falling into the single, narrowly drawn "occupational category" of
stewardess. Disparity of treatment violative of Section 703(a)(1) may exist whether it is
universal throughout the company or confined to a particular position. Nor is the fact of
discrimination negated by United's claim that the female employees occupy a unique
position so that there is no distinction between members of opposite sexes within the job
category. Considerations of the peculiar characteristics of the position only pertain to the
claim of a bona fide occupational qualification under Section 703(e)(1).
Id. at 1198.
71. Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. Id. Etta Ruth Stroud worked from 1956 through April of 1965 with the airline. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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denied. 75 Mrs. Stroud then sued Delta, claiming that they had violated
her Title VII rights and had refused to reinstate her because she was a
married woman.76
The court acknowledged that on the surface this might appear to be
a "sex-plus" discrimination situation because a certain class of women,

married women, were being denied employnent 7 7 However, the court
held that a "sex-plus" discrimination claim can only be made when

women are treated differently than men.78 Until December 1972, it was
Delta's policy only to hire women for the position of stewardess;
therefore, Mrs. Stroud could not make the claim that she was being
treated differently than the men.79 As a result, the court found that
there was no discrimination because Mrs. Stroud was not being treated

differently than males."0 Without a showing of differential treatment
based on a sex-neutral characteristic (in this case marriage), there could

be no "sex-plus" discrimination!'
While the courts in Sprogis and Stroud reached different conclu-

sions, they agreed that a no-marriage rule constitutes a Title VII "sexplus" violation when it is applied only to women and not to men in the
same position.

2

"same position.

However, the courts differ as to what constitutes the
83

The Sprogis court defines "same position" as an

75. Id.
76. Mrs. Stroud relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which makes it unlawful for an employer.
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or. national
origin;....
Id. at 893 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 894.
79. Id. at 893. The court held that:
Here, plaintiff is not a member of one of the relevant identifiable classes which has been
discountenanced in favor of another class. Rather, certain women - stewardesses who are
unmarried - are favored over certain other women - stewardess who are married. As one
of the all-female group of flight attendants employed by Delta, plaintiff suffered a
discrimination, but it was based on marriage, and not sex. Men were not favored over
women; they simply were not involved in the functioning of the policy.
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 894. Accord Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1044 (3d Cir. 1973)
(holding that the married women were unable to establish discrimination because there was no basis
on which the women could be compared to similarly situated men).
82. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198; Stroud, 544 F.2d at 893.
83. CompareSprogis,444 F.2d at 1198 (holding that ano marriage rule hpplied only to women
was sex plus discrimination) with Stroud, 544 F.2d at 893 (holding that a no marriage rule applied
only to women was not discrimination because since no males were hired as stewards, the women
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employee working for the same company, while the Stroud court defines
"same position" as someone working in the same occupational position. 4
Although married persons as a group are not provided protection
under Title VII, they have found relief under Title VII through the "sexplus" doctrine.85 The same has been true for sexually promiscuous persons. 6 Rules concerning sexual promiscuity have been treated very
similarly to no-marriage rules by the courts.87 For example, employers
may not bar promiscuous females or unwed mothers from unemploy88
ment, while employing promiscuous men and unwed fathers.
D.

Sex Plus Grooming & Sex Plus Dress

The "sex-plus" theory has also been applied to employees who have
been denied employment or who have been fired for refusing to comply
with rules governing employee hair length and proper dress.8 9
However, these employees have not been very successful in seeking
90
relief under a "sex-plus" theory.
In Willingham v. Macon TelegraphPublishingCo., for example, Mr.
Willingham was denied employment because his hair exceeded the acceptable length set forth in the Macon Telegraph's grooming code. 91
However, the company only applied the code to exclude men with long
hair, and not women.92 Therefore, Mr. Willingham argued that Macon

were not being treated differently).
84. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198; Stroud, 544 F.2d at 893-94.

85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. Title VII does not make it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against "married" persons; it only protects individuals from being discriminated
against based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2 (a).
86. Krzyzewski v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1024, 1031

(M.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding rule barring promiscuous females but not promiscuous males from
employment to be violative of Title VII).
87. Id.

88. Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding termination of
unwed mother to be in violation of Title VII); Dolter v. Vahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266,271
(N.D. Iowa 1980) (holding rule barring unwed mothers but not unwed fathers to be in violation of
Title VII).

89. See infra notes 91-131 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 91-131 and accompanying text.

91. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub]. Co. 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975). Macon
Telegraph's grooming code required all employees who came into contact with the public to be

neatly dressed in accordance with the standards customarily accepted in the business community.
Id. The grooming code was originally implemented following the surrounding community's disap-

proval of long-haired males. Id.
92. Id.
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Telegraph was unlawfully discriminating on the basis of sex because
there was no similar hair length restriction for women.93
Mr.
Willingham's theory was that "sex-plus" should include "sex plus any
sexual stereotype." Accordingly, since short hair is stereotypically a
characteristic possessed by males, requiring this of all men would be a
Title VII violation.94
The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Willingham's argument and held
that Macon Telegraph's employee grooming policy did not constitute sex
discrimination. 95 The court's reasoning was twofold. 95 First, the court
reasoned that it was unlikely that Congress had intended for Title VII to
encompass discrimination based on grooming.9 7 In the court's opinion,
employers have the right to exercise discretion when it comes to the
operation of their businesses so long as they do not deny equal access to
the job.98 Second, the court held that the doctrine of "sex-plus" discrimination only bars employers from discriminating on the basis of
immutable characteristics (such as race or national origin) and legally
protected rights (such as the right to marry or the right to have
children). 9 Since hair length is neither an immutable characteristic nor
a legally protected right, the court denied Mr. Willingham's sex
discrimination claim.' e In reaching its decision, the court also relied
on the fact that Macon Telegraph had a grooming code which applied to
both male and female employees.10'
In its conclusion, the Willingham court carefully noted that its
holding should not be misinterpreted as providing support for sexual
stereotyping. 2 The court simply expressed its belief that it did not
have the authority to expand the protection afforded under Title VII
without further congressional action. °3

93. Id. at 1088. Mr. Willingham based his claim on a theory of sex plus hair length
discrimination. Id.
94. Id. at 1089.
95. Id. at 1092.
96. Id. at 1090.
97. Id. The court went on to state that it should not expand the reach of Title VII into a
questionable area without a stronger Congressional mandate. Id.
98. Id. at 1092.
99. Id. at 1091.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1092. Female employees also had to be neatly dressed and groomed. Id. at 1087.
However, there was no provisions within the code requiring females to keep their hair short. Id.
102. Id. at 1092. The court did not want to be misunderstood as saying that men with long hair
were not as capable of performing the job as men with short hair. Id.
103. Id. Since Title VII does not provide protection to long-haired individuals, the court was
not prepared to do so. Id.
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The majority of cases involving "sex plus" grooming discrimination

have been brought by males.' In virtually all of these types of cases,
the courts have consistently held that "sex plus" grooming discrimination
is not a violation of Title VII because hair length is not an immutable
characteristic."0 5 Accordingly, "sex plus" grooming can be distin-

guished from "sex plus" marriage because the latter denies a legally
enforceable right, namely marriage.'
Employees have been more successful applying the "sex-plus"
theory to dress codes." 7 In EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., Margaret

Hasselman worked as a lobby attendant in a Manhattan office building
from February, 1973 until June 4, 1976."0s Ms. Hasselman's position
required her to handle the building's security, safety, and maintenance.'
She was also responsible for offering assistance and provid0
ing information to visitors when they first entered the building."
Ms. Hasselman's uniform was both selected and paid for by Sage
Realty Corporation."1 The company required her to wear the uniform
at all times and provided a new uniform every six months."' On May
12, 1976, Ms. Hasselman was given a new uniform, the "Bicentennial
uniform", to wear."' When she tried on the uniform, she found that

104. See, eg., Barker, 549 F.2d at 401; Longo, 537 F.2d at 685; Earvood, 539 F.2d at 1351;
Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337; Rafford, 348 F. Supp. at 317.
105. See, eg., Barker v. Taft 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that an employer's
grooming policy regulating the way men were to have their hair cut and the way women were to
have their hair styled was not a Title VII violation); Longov. DeCoppet 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that a grooming code requiring only male employees to have short hair was not a
Title VII violation); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.
1976) (holding that a grooming code applicable to males was not a Title VII violation); Dodge v.
Giant Food Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the requirement for male
employees to keep their hair short was not a Title VII violation); Rafford v. Randle Eastern
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316,317 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (holding that employer's grooming
policy which required male employees to shave their beards and mustaches was not a Title VII
violation).
106. See supra part II.C.
107. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
108. E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
109. Id. at 603.
110. Id.
Ii. Id.
112. Id.
113. The uniform was designed to celebrate the nation's bicentennial year. Id. at 604. The
uniform, which resembled an American flag, consisted of broad red, white, and blue stripes. Id.
It was shaped like an octagon and contained an opening for the attendant's head. Id. The uniform
was supposed to be worn as a cape that would drape over the shoulders and snap at the wrists. Id.
It was otherwise open at the sides. Id. Underneath the cape the lobby attendants were expected to
wear blue dancer pants with sheer stockings. Id. The attendants were not permitted to wear any-
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it was too short and revealing. 4 Even after the uniform was altered,
it "was1 15uneven and remained as revealing as it had been in its unaltered
form."
As a result of her wearing this uniform, Ms. Hasselman was
subjected to repeated harassment." 6 The situation was so upsetting to
Ms. Hasselman that she found it difficult to perform her job properly.' 7 Ms. Hasselman persisted in trying to have the uniform altered,
but no adequate accommodation was made." 8 Finally, on June 4,
1976, Ms. Hasselman decided not to wear the uniform." 9 On June 7,
1976, Ms. Hasselman was given an ultimatum: she was either to wear the
uniform or sign a "layoff' letter. 120
The issue before the court was whether the requirement to wear the
"Bicentenniar' uniform constituted sex discrimination under Title
VII.' 2 ' The court ruled in Ms. Hasselman's favor after reasoning that
the dress requirement in this situation was-an infringement on Ms.
Hasselman's privacy rights; thus distinguishing her case from those
The court also rejected Sage
involving grooming restrictions."'z
Realty's argument that the wearing of the "Bicentennial" uniform was a
bona fide occupational qualification." The court concluded that while
there was no sex discrimination per se in the dress code, the code still
constituted a Title VII violation because it subjected Ms. Hasselman to
sexual harassment. 2 4
In Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n,"z the
Court of Appeals was faced with a sex plus dress claim brought by fe-

thing under the cape. Id.Although the female lobby attendants wore different sizes, the uniform
came in only one size. Id.
114. Id. Portions of Ms. Hasselman's thighs and buttock could be seen. Also, when she moved
in certain positions (that her job required) her waist was visible. Id.
115. Id. at 605.
116. Id. She was sexually propositioned and was the subject of lewd comments and gestures.
Id.
117. Id.
at 605-06.
118. Id.
at 606.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 607.
121. Id. at 610.
122. Id. at 609 n.15. It should be noted that the court recognized the fact that Ms. Hasselman
was not being treated differently than male employees because no males were employed as lobby
attendants at that time. Id. However, the court was convinced that had males been employed, they
would not have had to wear the "Bicentennial" uniforms. Id.
123. Id. at 611.
124. Id.
125. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
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male bank tellers.126 The uniforms in question did not subject the
female employees to sexual harassment.' 27 However, the differing
dress codes required the female employees to incur additional costs that
the male employees did not have to pay.'
The Second Circuit found in favor of the female employees and held
that while employers have the right to require their employees to wear
129
a uniform, they cannot exercise this right in a discriminatory manner.
The court reasoned that when males and females perform the same job,
it is not permissible to allow the men to wear normal business attire
while requiring the females to wear uniforms. 3 ' Although the facts in
Talman are quite different from the facts in Sage Realty Corp., both
courts held that 3 "sex plus" dress discrimination will not be tolerated
under Title VII.
E. Sex Plus Stereotyped Characteristics
Another area in which the "sex-plus" theory has been applied is sex
plus sexual stereotyping discrimination.'
The application of the "sexplus" doctrine in this area has successfully established that a bona fide
occupational qualification cannot be based
on a stereotyped classification
33
of groups protected under Title VIH.
In 1969, the female employees at Colgate-Palmolive sued the
company alleging sex discrimination."3 Their claim was based on the
company's differential job distribution policy. 35 Due to the nature of
the business, Colgate-Palmolive assigned employees to different jobs

126. Id. at 1029. Talman Savings and Loan required its female employees to wear a uniform,
but only required that male employees dress in a business like manner. Id.

127. See id. at 1030.
128. Id. The cost of the uniform was considered to be part of the women's salary. Also, the
female employees had to pay for the cleaning and maintenance of their uniforms. Id. In addition,

if the women wanted additional parts of the uniform so they did not have to wear the same uniform
everyday, they had to pay these expenses as well. Id. The male employees, on the other hand, were
not required to wear a company uniform (although they were required to do so until 1968). Id.
129. Id. at 1032.

130. Id. The court went one step further and held that there could be no bona fide occupational
qualification defense because it is clear that women could just as easily dress in a business-like
manner without wearing uniforms. Id.
131. Talman, 604 F.2d at 1033; Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 611.
132. See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.

133. See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
134. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
135. Id. at 714.
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each veek. 3 6 There were two classes of jobs from which the employees were assigned, male jobs and female jobs.13 7 The male
employees could request jobs from either classification, but the female
employees were only eligible to perform the female jobs.'3 8 The
women were restricted to jobs that did not require the lifting of objects
weighing over thirty-five pounds.

9

The Seventh Circuit held that Colgate-Palmolive's differential job
distribution policy constituted sex discrimination because the policy did
not consider its female employees as individuals, but rather as a weaker
class. 4 The court further held that Colgate-Palmolive was free to
enforce a thirty-five pound weight lifting requirement on all of its
41
employees as long as it screened both men and women.
Another influential case in the area of sex plus stereotyped
characteristics discrimination was brought by Ms. Lorena Weeks in
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.' 42 Ms. Lorena
Weeks had worked for Southern Bell for nineteen years when she applied
to be a switchman. 43 Ms. Weeks submitted her application on March
17, 1966, and on April 18, 1966, she was informed that Southern Bell
had decided not to employ women as switchmen.'" As a result, Ms.
Weeks filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and shortly thereafter, she filed a suit against Southern
Bell. 145
It was undisputed that Ms. Weeks was denied the position because
she was a woman." The switchman position was given to the only
other employee who applied, a man with less seniority. 47 However,
Southern Bell's decision not to hire Ms. Weeks was not based on its
perception of her as an individual. Rather Southern Bell refused to hire
her because they did not believe any woman was capable of performing

136. Id. at 715.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 717-18. Colgate-Palmolive based the policy on its belief that women were not
capable of lifting as much weight as men. rd.
141. Id. at 718.
142. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) [hereinafter Southern

Bell].
143. Id. at 230.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 231.

147. Id.
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the job. Southern Bell took the position that the job of switchman was
too strenuous for a woman.148 The company felt that it would be too
difficult for a woman to lift equipment 49weighing over thirty pounds and
to be on call twenty-four hours a day.'
The Seventh Circuit found in favor of Ms. Weeks and held that
Southern Bell's refusal to hire women as switchmen was based on a
stereotyped characterization of women, rather than on a woman's
individual and actual abilities.50 The court reasoned that reliance on
stereotyped characterizations only helps to perpetuate the very evils Title

Therefore, Southern Bell's policy was
VII was formed to eliminate.'
'
held to constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 152
IT. FISHER V VASSAR COLLEGE'53
A. Procedural History and Procedural Posture
1. District Court Decision
On June 14, 1993, Dr. Fisher, then a faculty member of Vassar
College, appeared before the Southern District Court of New York.'- 4
She filed a suit against Vassar College alleging violations of Title VII,

148. Id. at 232. The job description for the switchman position read as follows:
Engaged in the maintenance and operation of dial central office equipment, test, power,
frame, switch, and other telephone equipment, including the locating and correcting of
faults; making adjustments, additions, repairs and replacements; performing routine operation tests, etc., and working with test-desk, field, and other forces connected with central
office work. Also operates and maintains, including adjusting and making repairs to or
replacement of, air conditioning equipment, and performing other work as assigned in
accordance with local circumstances and the current need of the business.
Id.
149. Id. at 234-35.
150. Id. at 235.
151. Id. The court held that:
Title VII rejects just this type of romantic patemalism as unduly Victorian and instead
vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic
tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the incremental increase in
remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth
the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on equal footing.
Id. at 236.
152. Id.
153. 852 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, Nos. 94-7737, 94-7785, 94-9125, 1995 WL
527804 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 1995).
154. 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Equal
Pay Act.'55 After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) Fisher
established that she was denied tenure in violation of Title VII; 156 (2)
Fisher established that she was denied tenure in violation of the ADEA
because of her age;" and (3) Fisher established that she was denied
equal pay for equal work. 58
The district court further held that Fisher was entitled to recover
back pay with interest less any amounts earned during the period from
1986, when she was discharged, until the present.' 59 She was also entitled to recover double damages under the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA.
However, the court ruled that it was up to Fisher to determine the form
of damages she wanted to recover because she was only entitled to one
type of monetary recovery.'6 The court also held that Fisher was
entitled to receive attorney's fees and costs.' 6 1 Furthermore, the court

ordered that Dr. Fisher was entitled to reinstatement as an Associate
Professor of Biology with tenure, but that after two years, she would be
subject to the college's evaluation process.' 62
2. Appeal and Cross-Appeal
Both Fisher and Vassar College appealed the district court's
Vassar argued that the district court committed reversible
decision.
error and based its appeal on three grounds." First, that Dr. Fisher
65
had failed to sustain her burden of proving intentional discrimination1
In addition, the court's "sex-plus" analysis was faulty because the court
failed to compare Dr. Fisher to similarly situated married men; the court
Second, the statistical
had compared her to only single women."
proof relied on by the court was fundamentally flawed and clearly

155. Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1230.
Id.at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
See Appellee's Brief, Fisher(No. 94-7737); Appellant's Brief, Fisher(No. 94-7737).
Appellant's Brief at 1-2, Fisher(No, 94-7737).

Id.
Id.
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erroneous. 6 7 Third, the district court's findings as to the age discrimination claim and the violation of the Equal Pay Act, along with the
168
resultant remedies imposed, all constituted reversible error.
Dr. Fisher's cross-appeal was predicated on two grounds.' 69 First,

the district court failed to rule, based upon the facts actually found by the
court, that there was a prima facie case of "simple" sex discrimination.
Second, it was an error for the court, in an attempt to make Dr. Fisher
"whole," to grant relief in the form of her reinstatement as an Associate
Professor of Biology with tenure for a period of two years, only
thereafter to subject her to an evaluation process similar to the one that
initially led to the lawsuit.'
3.

Second Circuit Decision

On September 7, 1995, the Second Circuit dismissed Dr. Fisher's
lawsuit. 7' The court vacated the judgments of the district court and
held that the district court's conclusions of liability on the sex discrimination claim, the age discrimination claim, and the Equal Pay Act claim
were clearly erroneous." The court concluded that Dr. Fisher was not
entitled to attorney's fees since none of her claims were successful.1 73
Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's rejection of Dr.
Fisher's "simple" sex discrimination claim and therefore, held that it was
not necessary to address Dr. Fisher's cross-appeal regarding the terms of
her reinstatement."7
IV

DR. FISHER

Dr. Fisher is a married woman who was fifty five years old when
she was denied tenure."7 At that time she also had two daughters,
ages twenty and seventeen. 7 6 She holds a Bachelor's degree from the
University of Wisconsin, and Master's and Ph.D. degrees in Zoology
167. Id. at 2. In addition, the college claimed that stray anecdotal remarks by non decisionmakers were improperly considered. Id.
168. Id.
169. Appellee's Brief at 3, Fisher(No. 94-7737).

170. Id.
171. Fisher, 1995 WL 527804 at *34.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Appellee's Brief at 3, Fisher(No. 94-7737).
176. Id.
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from Rutgers University."' Dr. Fisher engaged in post doctoral work
at Rutgers Medical School from 1963 to 1965.171 After she finished
her academic work in 1965, she remained at home with her daughters
and kept in touch with the field of zoology by reading journals and
keeping up with work in the field of biology. 17 9 This "hiatus" terminated in 1974, when she returned to teaching biology at Marist College
She was at Marist until 1977, when
in Poughkeepsie, New York.'
Vassar College hired her as a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Biology
Department."8 '
Dr. Fisher remained in the Vassar Biology department as an
Assistant Professor, and was promoted to a tenure-track position in
1980.182 Her performance was reviewed in 1982, at which time she
received a contract extension and a contract renewal for three years,
which brought her up for tenure review in 1985.183 She was denied
tenure on March 29, 1985.'m
At the time of her tenure review, Dr. Fisher had seven peerreviewed publications and a completed manuscript, which was subsequently published in a peer-reviewed journal.' 5 She had secured three
financial grants to support this work prior to accepting her position with
Vassar College. While at Vassar, she went on to secure five substantial
grants from the National Science Foundation ("NSF") as well as several
intramural grants." 6 Dr. Fisher also had significant consulships with
the NSF and the National Institute for Health.'
V. DISTRIcT COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE VII CLAIM

A. Simple Sex Claim
Dr. Fisher alleged that she was discriminated against "because of her

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Fisher,852 F. Supp. at 1197.
Id.
Appellee's Brief at 3, Fisher (No. 94-7737).
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Fisher,852 F. Supp. at 1197.
Appellee's Brief at 8, Fisher (No. 94-7737).
Id. at 9.

187. Id.
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sex."'I
The district court considered Dr. Fisher's claim as both a
simple sex discrimination claim and a sex plus marriage claim. 9
However, the district court held that Dr. Fisher failed to establish a
valid claim of simple sex discrimination. 9 ' In reaching this determination, the court relied on the following facts. t9' First, another female
professor in the Biology Department who was considered for tenure at
the same time as Dr. Fisher was granted tenure."9 Second, a male
professor who was considered for tenure at the same time as Dr. Fisher
was denied tenure. 93 Third, Vassar College's tenure review committee
was comprised of several female professors from within the Biology
Department." 4 Fourth, several women in the Biology Department had
been previously tenured 95 The district court found that these factors
prevented Dr. Fisher from establishing a prima facie case of simple sex
discrimination.9 6

B. Sex Plus Marriage Claim
Dr. Fisher presented the following evidence in support of her sex
plus marriage claim: evidence distinguishing between the "hard" sciences
departments (including Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Geology, Biolo-97
gy, and Computer Science) and the college's other departments;'
evidence that the "hard" sciences' faculties had traditionally been
composed of men, both married and single, and women (single only);198 evidence that although married women constituted fifty-two
percent of the women in the sciences nationally, no married women had
188. Fisher,852 F. Supp. at 1224. According to the court:
Discrimination "because of... sex," as used in Title VII, does not refer only to

discrimination due to sex alone. The scope of Section 703 (a)(1) is not confined to
explicit discrimination based 'solely' on sex. In forbidding employers to discriminate

against individuals because oftheir sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.
Id.
189. Id. at
190. L. at
191. Id. at
192. Id. at

1224-25.
1225.

1224.
1225.

193. Id.
194. Id.

195. Id.
196. Id.Ms. Fisher showed that she was a member of protected class and that she was qualified
for the job, but she failed to show that similarly situated men were being treated any differently.
Id.
197. Id.at 1225-26.
198. Id.at 1226.
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ever been tenured in any of the "hard" sciences departments at Vassar
College.19 9 The essence of Dr. Fisher's sex plus marriage allegation
was her assertion that the decision to deny her tenure was based on the
200
fact that she had left academia for eight years to raise a family.
Vassar College rebutted Dr. Fisher's allegations by presenting
evidence to show that she was denied tenure due to the unfavorable
tenure evaluations she had received0 1 In addition, Vassar argued that
the professors who had received tenure were more qualified and better
fulfilled the needs of the department than Dr. Fisher. 2
The district court found in Dr. Fisher's favor and held that Vassar
was guilty of "sex-plus" discrimination in violation of Title VII. 20 3
The court reached this determination based on the following findings.
First, Dr. Fisher was a member of a protected class under Title VII.
Second, Dr. Fisher was qualified for tenure. Third, Dr. Fisher was
rejected under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination?' The court further found Vassar's affirmative defense
to be merely a pretext for discrimination because its standards were
arbitrary and in many cases unwritten.2 5
C.

Arguments Against the District Court's Holding in Fisher

The district court's findings with respect to Dr. Fisher's sex-plus
marriage claim were erroneous for two primary reasons. First, the
factual and logical interpretation of the case was inaccurate, and second,
the tenure selection rights of a private university should not be evaluated

by the courts.
Dr. Fisher based her "sex-plus" claim largely on the fact that prior
to joining the Vassar faculty, she had taken a hiatus from her career to
raise a family.20 6 Her argument is that Vassar College interpreted this
to mean that she was more committed to her family than to her career,

199. Id.
200. Id. From 1965-1974, Dr. Fisher left her academic career to raise her family.
201. Id. at 1227.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1229.
204. Id. at 1226. Ms. Fisher presented "evidence that prior to, contemporaneous with, and
subsequent to her denial of tenure, the Biology Department at Vassar College tenured only faculty
members who were not married women (single women, single men, and married men) and who had
qualifications less than or equal to hers." Id. at 1227.
205. Id. at 1228.
206. Id. at 1226.
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and therefore, they denied her tenure. 2 °7
Her argument is unpersuasive in light of the following facts. Dr.
Fisher's hiatus was from 1965 to 1974; she was not offered a position at
Vassar College until 1977.28 At the time Dr. Fisher was denied
tenure, her daughters were ages seventeen and twenty. Thus, the
suggestion that Vassar based its decision on a hiatus taken by Dr. Fisher
prior to her employment at Vassar was not supported by any facts
presented in the case.20 9 The mere fact that she took her hiatus prior
to working at Vassar also makes it appear illogical that the college would
decide to deny her tenure on this basis. Further, if Vassar had relied on
this event as a determinative factor in its decision, it seems that it would
have been viewed favorably rather than negatively because the fact that
Dr. Fisher had already raised her family eliminated the risk that she
would one day decide to leave Vassar to do so.2 "
Dr. Fisher's sex plus marriage claim, implied that Vassar College
discriminated against married women because of a stereotypical view of
the wife and mother. However, the particulars of Dr. Fisher's situation
placed her in a position quite contrary to that of the stereotypical wife
and mother. The fact that she had already raised her family, and the fact
that her daughters were young adults suggested that Dr. Fisher was in a
perfect position to dedicate her time to her career.
Secondly, the district court's holding was erroneous because it relied
on the fact that some of the college's tenure standards were unwritten
and arbitrary.2
Vassar is a private college, and as such its freedom
to make tenure decisions should not be disturbed by the courts. As a
private institution, Vassar has every right to develop its own tenure
policy, and what might appear to be arbitrary to the court might be perfectly clear to those faculty members presiding on the tenure review
committee. While it would have been better if all the standards were in
writing so as to give notice to the faculty, Vassar's rights as a private
university were improperly weighed by the court.

207. Id.
208. Id.

209. See id. at 1227.
210. The fact that Dr. Fisher's daughters were ages 17 and 20 is also relevant because children
of this age, as opposed to infants and young children, do not need to be attended to by their mother
at all times. The fact that Dr. Fisher's children were not infants was something that Vassar, in all
likelihood, would once again look at favorably rather than negatively.
211. Fisher, 852 F. Supp. at 1227.
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VI.

263

SECOND CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE VII CLAIM

In drawing it's conclusion that Vassar had discriminated against Dr.
Fisher based on a theory of "sex-plus" discrimination, the district court
relied on the following evidence: anecdotes; perceived admissions from
members of the Vassar tenure committee; statistics; and expert testimonyP' The Second Circuit held that taken together or individually,
none of the evidence provided sufficient proof for a finding of "sex-plus"

discrimination?' 3
According to the Second Circuit, Vassar successfilly responded to

Dr. Fisher's allegation of discrimination by showing a non-discriminatory
basis for the denial of tenure to Dr. Fisher.2 14 As indicated in the
tenure committee's fourteen page report, Dr. Fisher was denied tenure
due to her lack of scholarship, teaching, ability, service, and leader-

ship.215
Dr. Fisher was unsuccessful in showing that Vassar's basis for her
rejection was simply a pretext for an underlying motive of either sex or
sex plus marriage discrimination?' 6 Therefore, Dr. Fisher failed to
meet her burden of proof under the McDonnell Douglas test.

7

In

order to succeed on her sex plus marriage theory, Dr. Fisher needed to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Vassar's claims of
lack of scholarship, teaching ability, service, and leadership were a pre-

text for its discrimination against married women.218

However, the

Second Circuit found Dr. Fisher's use of anecdotal evidence to be

212. Fisher, 1995 WL 527804 at *14.
213. Id. at *26.
214. Id. at *10.
215. Id. The report stated, "[ojverall [the department was] not satisfied by Ms. Fisher's service
to the college may be adequate it is in no way outstanding... [and] not of sufficiently high quality
for promotion:' Id.
216. Id.
217. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court devised a three part test for applying Title VII. First, the plaintiff must present a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (a) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
that the plaintiff
(b)that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for an available position and; (c)
was denied the position; and (d) that the position remained open and that applications for the
position were still being accepted. Id. at 802. Second, once the plaintiff has set out a prima facie
case, tlie
employer has the burden of providing a "legitimate non.discriminatory" basis for the denial
of employment. Id. Third, if the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then has the burden
of showing that the reason stated by the employer is pretextual. Id. at 804.
218. See Fisher, 1995 WL 527804 at *9 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742

(1993)).
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insufficient to meet this burden because the anecdotes she offered did not
involve married women who were being considered for tenure and the
Vassar staff members that Dr. Fisher spoke of did not have any influence
over her tenure decision.?
Dr. Fisher's party admissions" 0 also failed to meet her burden of
proof because she relied on a note which the district court had erroneous-

ly construed?" t In addition, the Second Circuit failed to accept Dr.
Fisher's statistics of discrimination because they amounted to "mere
and could not "be credited or relied on to
organized anecdotes '
'
support a result." m Finally, the court refused to accept the expert

testimony of Dr. Simon, Dr. Fisher's only expert witness, as evidence of
pretext because Dr. Simon's testimony was based on her review of Dr.
Fisher's statistics and Dr. Simon's own nationwide study of female
science professors?2 4

However, the Second Circuit concurred with the district court that
the reasons proffered by Vassar were pretextual. z 5 Nevertheless, the

Second Circuit held that the likeliest basis for Vassar's pretext was the
department's dislike of and lack of respect for Dr. Fisher. 6 Therefore,
the evidence of pretext was weak, and without affirmative proof of
discrimination, the Second Circuit was left with little choice but to
reverse the district court's decision?2'

219. Fisher, 1995 WL 527804 at *14-18.
220. The term "party admission" refers to statements made by faculty members at Vassar that
Dr. Fisher was offering as evidence of unlawful discrimination.
221. Fisher, 1995 WL 527804 at *17-20. Dr. Fisher presented a copy of her Faculty Record
Card on which the Dean commented that there was "overkill on the dept's part." Id. at *19. Dr.
Fisher offered, and the district court interpreted this, as evidence of the Dean's belief that the
department acted may have acted with a bias toward Dr. Fisher. Id. However, the Second Circuit
concluded that the use of the word "overkill" could simply have meant that the Dean believed the
report was vehement. Id. Moveover, the court held that the notation presented no evidence that the
department acted out of any bias toward Dr. Fisher. Id.
222. Id. at *25.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *13.
226. Id. at *14.
227. Id. at *14. As a result of the Second Circuit's holding, Dr. Fisher has lost more than one
million dollars in damages and attorney's fees in addition to her reinstatement to a tenure-track
position at Vassar College. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicolas J. Pappas, Discrimination in Tenure
Decisions,N.Y. L., Oct. 2, 1995, at 3.
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VII.
A.

CONCLUSION

On the Theory of "Sex-Plus" Discrimination

Title VII was passed to provide equal rights in employment, and its
passage opened thousands of doors for women and minorities?"
However, Title VII also took away some rights 9 For example, Title
VII eliminated the right of employer's to autonomously decide their
hiring practices?" Unsurprisingly, Title VII was not well received by
all employers, and on several occasions, employers have attempted to
circumvent Title VII by claiming that their discriminatory treatment was
based on a non-protected characteristic (such as marital status or
dress), 3 ' Unfortunately, Title VII did not account for such employer
behavior and, under a strict reading of Title VIE, such behavior is
permissible.
The theory of "sex-plus" was developed as means to end this type
of employer circumvention of the statute .1 2 For instance, "sex-plus"
discrimination has successfully prevented employers from using nonprotected characteristics (such as dress, marriage, and stereotypes) as
justifications for their true discriminatory intent? 3
B. On Fisher
As a member of a protected class, this author finds the doctrine of
"sex-plus" discrimination to be very reassuring because the doctrine
sends out a very clear message that discrimination will not be tolerated.
However, the Fishercase is troubling because the district court's holding
illustrates some of the consequences that may result from employees'
abuse of the doctrine. The "sex-plus" argument is very much analogous
to the bona fide occupational qualification contained within Title

228. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
229. Title VII protects individuals from being denied employment based on that individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).
230. As a result of the passage of Title VII, employers could no longer deny employment to an
individual based on that individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
231. See supra part II.C-F.
232. See supra part ll.B.
233. "Seesupra part II.C-F.
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VII3 "Sex-plus" allows an employee/applicant to find an immutable
characteristic about herself, which she can then add to her protected

status, and then use that characteristic to claim discrimination.235
Similarly, the bona fide occupational qualification exception allows an

employer to take a characteristic about an employee, and use it a basis
to refute a discrimination claim3 6 Just as employers can abuse the
bona fide occupational exception to Title VII, so can employees abuse
the "sex-plus" doctrine.
Dr. Fisher abused the "sex-plus" doctrine because her claim of sex

plus marriage discrimination was both invalid and illogical. However,
as the district court pointed out in its decision, she may have been able

to bring a prima facie simple sex discrimination claim if she could have
demonstrated disparate impact.3 7
While there may be universities in this country where women and
minorities go virtually unrepresented on the faculty, Vassar College does
not appear to be one of those institutions. Both Dr. Fisher and the dis-

trict court used the doctrine of "sex-plus" discrimination to an abusive
extent at the expense of Vassar College. Civil rights advocates and
women organizations should choose their battles more carefully. The
Fishercase demonstrates the dangers of not being prepared for the battle
you have undertaken.
InDecember of 1995, Dr. Fisher will likely file a writ of certiorari

to the Supreme Court to have her case reheard. The Supreme Court

234. Section 2000e-2 (e)states in pertinent part:
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employment agency to classify, or to refer for employment any indiemployees, for art
vidual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances were religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e).
235. For example, a particularly short woman who is denied a position can claim that she was
denied the position not for being a woman, but for being a short woman. The fact that she is short
is the immutable characteristic and the fact that she is a woman places her in a protected class.
236. For example, if there is job opening for a male model, an employer does not have to accept
applications from any female applicants because being a male is bona fide occupational qualification.
The employer under these circumstances would have a valid bona fide occupational qualification
defense to any potential discrimination claims made by female applicants.
237. Fisher,852 F. Supp. at 1227 n.15.
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should deny her petition because the Second Circuit clearly resolved all
of the issues in the case on a very sound factual basis.
Wendi Barish
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